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No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the 
economy to enrich themselves or if police can be bought off by 
drug traffickers.1  
 President Barack Obama. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption in the international marketplace remains an endemic problem.2 
The U.S. government estimates that bribery affects competition for international 
commercial contracts worth billions of dollars each year.3 Sadly, the list of 
companies that, allegedly, have engaged in bribery of foreign public officials 
includes numerous big names.4 The extensive list includes Hewlett-Packard, 
Oracle, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, Eli Lilly and Company, 
Ralph Lauren Corporation, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Alcoa World 
Alumina LLC,5 Walmart,6 AG Siemens, Halliburton,7 Tyson Foods, Lucent 
 
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2015; B.A., Psychology 
and Kinesiology, California State University, Sacramento, 2003. I thank my faculty advisor, Professor Michael 
Malloy, for his superb guidance and assistance. I also thank my family for their continued support. 
1. David M. Luna, The Georgetown Journal of International Law 2010 Symposium: Combating Global 
Corruption (FCPA Enforcement), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/ 
rm/139408.htm. 
2. Turning a Blind Eye to Bribing Foreign Officials, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/turning_a_blind_eye_to_bribing_foreign_officials; Helping Countries 
Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www1.worldbank.org/ 
publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor08.htm (last visited May 13, 2014); see TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING 
CORRUPTION: PROGRESS REPORT 2014: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING 
FOREIGN BRIBERY 2-7 (2014), available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting 
_corruption_progress_report_2014_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd. 
3. Thomas J. White, U.S. Efforts to Combat Foreign Corrupt Practices, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
162, 163 (1998). 
4. These companies have been investigated for, charged with, settled as a result of being charged with, 
plead guilty to, or convicted of bribing foreign public officials. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml. 
5. In January 2014, Alcoa World Alumina LLC, a subsidiary of the aluminum giant, Alcoa Inc., plead 
guilty to bribing officials in Bahrain. The company settled with U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for a combined $384 million in criminal fines, forfeiture, and 
disgorgement. The total amount of the settlement and the $161 million in disgorgement that Alcoa agreed to are 
some of the largest amounts of such penalties in FCPA enforcement history. Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
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Technologies, Chevron, Avon Products,8 Monsanto, Titan Corporation, Triton 
Energy Limited, and InVision Technologies9.10 
Bribery on the international level results in many grave consequences.11 It 
distorts markets, hinders economic development, and undermines democratic 
accountability.12 It inflicts massive costs on countries, causes misallocation of 
resources, distorts public policy, and undermines enforcement of rule of law.13 It 
hurts those companies that choose to follow the law and rightfully refuse to 
participate in bribery.14 Bribery in the international marketplace also severely 
threatens global security, as it enables transnational crimes, including drug 
trafficking and money laundering.15 
On August 1, 2013, Brazil enacted the Clean Company Act, placing 
administrative and civil liability on legal entities engaging in bribery of public 
officials.16 The Act went into effect on January 29, 2014.17 Brazil’s enactment of 
the Clean Company Act is a landmark development with global significance.18 As 
of 2013, Brazil is estimated to be the eight largest economy in the world, ranked 
 
JUSTICE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/January/14-crm-019.html; Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa 
Disgorgement is Third Biggest in FCPA History, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 10, 2014, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-disgorgement-is-third-biggest-in-fcpa-history.html. 
6. The DOJ and SEC are currently investigating allegations of bribery against the Mexican subsidiary of 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Wal-Mart de Mexico. The company allegedly paid bribes to Mexican government 
officials, between 2002 through 2005, in order to establish additional stores in certain regions. Breon S. Peace et 
al., The FCPA Statute of Limitations—a Way Out for Wal-Mart?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sep. 27, 2012), 
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/the-fcpa-statute-of-limitations%E2%80%94a-way-
out-for-wal-mart/. 
7. Halliburton Announces Settlement of Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, HALLIBURTON (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.halliburton.com/ 
public/news/pubsdata/press_release/2009/corpnws_021109.html. 
8. Rachel Louise Ensign, Details of $135 Million Avon FCPA Settlement Emerge, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 
2014, 10:31 AM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/05/01/details-of-135-million-avon-fcpa-
settlement-emerge/. 
9. SEC Settles Charges Against InVision Technologies for $1.1 Million for Violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/lr19078.htm. 
10. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, supra note 4. 
11. White, supra note 3, at 163. 
12. Id. 
13. BUREAU OF ECON. & BUS. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BATTLING INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY 1 
(2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36667.pdf. 
14. White, supra note 3, at 163. 
15. BUREAU OF ECON. & BUS. AFFAIRS, supra note 13, at 1. 
16. Lei No. L12846 [Clean Company Act], de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U] 
de 2.8.2013 (Braz.), available at http://www.cov.com/files/upload/E-Alert_Attachment_Brazilian_Clean_ 
Companies_Act_Original.pdf. In writing this Comment, the author has utilized an English translation of the 
Clean Company Act. 
17. Id.; J.P., Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Law: Hard to Read, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2014, 21:40), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/brazil-s-new-anti-corruption-law. 
18. Kevin M. LaCroix, The Brazilian Clean Companies Act, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (Dec. 11, 
2013), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/corporate/b/fcpa-compliance/archive/2013/12/11/the-brazilian-
clean-companies-act.aspx. 
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by Gross Domestic Product.19 It is also the largest and one of the most robust 
economies in Latin America.20 Brazil is thus recognized as a “significant political 
and economic power in Latin America, and an emerging global leader.”21 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned impressive credentials, corruption is a 
widespread and deeply-rooted phenomenon in Brazil.22 It is estimated that 
corruption costs the country approximately forty billion dollars each year.23 In 
2014, Brazil ranked sixty-nine out of 174 countries on the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index.24 This abysmal ranking reflects the 
nation’s substantial problems with corruption.25 
Despite such prevalence of corruption in Brazil, before the enactment of the 
Clean Company Act, Brazil’s express laws only held individuals liable for 
engaging in bribery of public officials, not legal entities.26 This was the state of 
law even though, since December 1977, Brazil had been a signatory of The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (the Convention or the Anti-Bribery Convention).27 The 
Convention requires that its signatory states (parties) impose criminal liability on 
legal entities engaging in bribery of foreign public officials.28 
This Comment argues that the Clean Company Act generally conforms to, 
and in several respects, even exceeds the requirements of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention.29 However, whether Brazil will successfully meet the expectations of 
the OECD and those of its people hinges upon Brazil’s proper enforcement of the 
 
19. The World FactBook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
20. Id.; Fernando Avelar, FCPA Risks for U.S. Companies in Latin America, Renewable Energy Thrives 
in Brazil, and the New PRI: Enrique Pena Nieto, 18 LAW & BUS. REV. AMS. 605, 608 (2012). 
21. PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33456, BRAZIL-U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2010). 
22. Brazil: One Million People Demand Accountability, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (June 21, 
2013), http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/brazil_one_million_people_demand_accountability; Shannon 
K ONeil, Dilma Rousseff Gearing Up for Reelection, VOXXI (Oct. 4, 2013), http://voxxi.com/2013/10/04/ 
dilma-rousseff-gearing-up-for-reelection/. 
23. Brazil: One Million People Demand Accountability, supra note 22. 
24. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www. 
transparency.org/cpi2014/results (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
25. Brazil: One Million People Demand Accountability, supra note 22. 
26. See infra Part II.E; THE WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, OECD, BRAZIL: PHASE 1 REVIEW OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 2 (2004), available at http://www.oecd. 
org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/33742137.pdf. 
27. See infra Part II.E; THE WORKING GROUP, supra note 26, at 2; Brazil Enacts Tough Anti-Bribery Law 
Required by OECD, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2013, 2:42 PM ET), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-
brazil-bribery-idUSBRE97111A20130802. 
28. See infra Part III.A.3; Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions art. 1, ¶¶ 1-2, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
29. See infra Part III. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
461 
Clean Company Act.30 Part II of this Comment explores the evolution of 
international anti-bribery laws, the OECD’s role, and the circumstances behind 
enactment of Brazil’s Clean Company Act. Part III compares the relevant 
provisions of the Convention to those of the Act and concludes that the Act meets 
each provision except Enforcement. Part IV proposes three key steps Brazil 
should take in order to effectively enforce its new law. Specifically, Brazil should 
make it a top priority to aggressively and objectively investigate and prosecute 
cases of bribery of public officials.31 Brazil should ensure that all enforcement 
agencies across the country adopt uniform procedures and interpretations of the 
Act.32 Lastly, it should collaborate with other countries in investigations and 
prosecutions.33 
II. BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS AGAINST BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
It has been said that the phenomenon of bribery is “as old as human nature 
itself.”34 This section explores the evolution of anti-bribery laws across the globe, 
the OECD’s role in setting standards for and enforcement of these anti-bribery 
laws, and the backdrop against which Brazil has enacted its landmark Clean 
Company Act. 
A. Evolution of International Anti-Bribery Laws 
During the last four decades, countries from across the globe have enacted 
legislation to combat bribery in international marketplace.35 The movement began 
when U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977.36 
The impetus for this initiative was the Watergate scandal of 1973, which had 
revealed much more than just a corrupt Richard Nixon presidency.37 The U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor discovered a widespread pattern of misconduct, where corporations 
had used their “slush” funds to make questionable payments to foreign agents.38 
More than 400 companies disclosed to the SEC that they had made questionable 
 
30. See infra Part III.H. 
31. See infra Part IV. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. Mark Pieth, Introduction, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 3, 5 (Mark 
Pieth et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
35. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
xvii (2d ed. 2010). 
36. Pieth, supra note 34, at 10-11; White, supra note 3, at 163. 
37. MIRIAM F. WEISMANN, CRIME, INCORPORATED: LEGAL AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 94 (2009). 
38. Id. at 94-95. 
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or illegal payments to foreign public officials and politicians.39 Such payments 
added up to more than $300 million.40 At the time, over 117 of these companies 
ranked in the top Fortune 500 companies.41 In a famous case, Gulf Oil 
Corporation and its vice president, Claude Wilde, were criminally prosecuted for 
using corporate funds to make illegal gifts to politicians, including a $100,000 
gift to President Richard Nixon.42 In another case, Lockheed Martin admitted 
making payments in the amount of twenty-two million dollars to foreign 
government officials.43 As a reaction to such revelations, the FCPA was enacted.44 
United States then began making efforts to internationalize the FCPA.45 
Influencing other countries to enact legislation similar to the FCPA became an 
important goal for the U.S. business community, Congress, and presidential 
administrations.46 This was partly because the U.S. business community quickly 
realized that the FCPA placed competitive disadvantage on U.S. businesses.47 
The law placed significant restrictions and requirements on U.S. businesses, none 
of which bound their non-U.S. competitors.48 Additionally, the United States 
believed that strong, uniform rules adopted by countries across the globe would 
lead to fostering “economic development and . . . deepening of democratic 
institutions.”49 
Consequently, in 1989, a year after the FCPA was reformulated, United 
States requested the OECD to draft an instrument on combating bribery of 
foreign public officials.50 The OECD appeared to be the best-suited organization 
for this purpose because its membership included major exporting and investing 
nations from across the globe.51 Furthermore, OECD’s well-established peer 
review system and soft law procedures especially attracted the United States.52 
 
39. Id. at 95. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 94. 
43. DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. 
FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 5-6 (2d ed. 1999). 
44. Id. at 7. 
45. United States encouraged United Nations to draft an anti-corruption treaty; however, that effort failed 
in 1979. Pieth, supra note 34, at 10-12. 
46. White, supra note 3, at 163. 
47. Pieth, supra note 34, at 11. 
48. See id. 
49. White, supra note 3, at 163. 
50. Pieth, supra note 34, at 12-13. 
51. Id. at 13. 
52. Id. 
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B. The OECD and Its Role 
The OECD was established in 1960 in order to help implement the European 
Recovery Program, also known as the Marshall Plan, a United States sponsored, 
post-World War II reconstruction plan for Europe.53 Since then, the OECD’s role 
has expanded and it now functions as the “pre-eminent organisation of the 
industrialised nations for international economic research” and analysis.54 
OECD’s mission is to promote “policies that will improve the economic and 
social well-being of people around the world.”55 Currently, while thirty-four 
countries from across the globe are members of the OECD, the organization also 
maintains cooperative relations with a large number of nonmember countries.56 
The OECD also maintains cooperative, official relations with other international 
organizations such as the International Labour Organization, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and many other United Nations bodies.57 
OECD is an active partner of the G20.58 
C. OECD’s System of Review 
Two organizations, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International 
Business Transactions and Transparency International, work together to ensure 
that parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention implement and enforce the 
Convention through their own laws.59 The Working Group generally conducts a 
rigorous, three-phase review of the steps taken by parties to implement the 
Convention.60 During Phase 1 review, the Working Group evaluates whether the 
implementing legislation of a party adequately conforms to the Convention.61 
During Phase 2 review, the Group determines whether the party is effectively 
applying its own legislation.62 During Phase 3 review, the Group assesses the 
party’s enforcement efforts again and makes further recommendations.63 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 14. 
55. About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
56. Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Dec. 
10, 2013). OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
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D. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 
Also known as the Anti-Bribery Convention, this multilateral treaty was 
adopted in December 1997 and entered into force in February 1999.64 Currently, 
forty countries from across the globe have signed on to the Convention, which 
include the thirty-four OECD members and six nonmembers—Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Russia, and South Africa.65 The Convention is the only 
international anti-corruption scheme that targets the “supply side” of the bribery 
transaction.66 Essentially, the Convention focuses on reducing the inflow of 
corrupt funds into economies.67 None of the Convention’s provisions apply to 
foreign commercial bribery, which concerns incidents where private individuals 
or legal entities provide kick-backs or other benefits to other private individuals 
or entities for delivering improper assistance in obtaining, retaining, or directing 
business.68 The Convention only covers transnational corruption in business 
transactions that involved delivery of any pecuniary or other advantage upon a 
public official.69 It does not target domestic corruption of any sort.70 
E. Enactment of Brazil’s Clean Company Act 
Several reasons served as the impetus for enactment of the Clean Company 
Act. Recently, Brazilian masses vehemently protested in more than eighty cities 
across Brazil, demanding that their politicians address the endemic problem of 
corruption in their country.71 Brazilians insisted that their politicians be held 
accountable.72 
Another reason that likely motivated Brazil to enact the Clean Company Act 
is encouragement from the OECD to comply with its Anti-Bribery Convention.73 
 
64. Pieth, supra note 34, at 19-20. 
65. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 
2015). 
66. Id.; Pieth, supra note 34, at 30-31. 
67. Pieth, supra note 34, at 30-31. 
68. DEMING, supra note 35, at 310, 316 n.10. 
69. Ingeborg Zerbes, The Offense of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, translated in THE OECD 
CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 59, 67-69 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014). 
70. Id. 
71. Brazil: One Million People Demand Accountability, supra note 22. 
72. Id. 
73. THE WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, OECD, BRAZIL: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 65 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/brazil/39801089.pdf; THE WORKING GROUP, supra 
note 26, at 35. 
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Brazil signed the Convention in 1997 and ratified it in 2000.74 Initially, in order to 
comply with the Convention, Brazil amended its Penal Code and criminalized 
bribery of foreign public officials by individuals.75 However, the country did not 
create any additional criminal, administrative, or civil penalties for legal entities 
who engaged in this offense.76 In its Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviews of Brazil’s 
efforts to implement the Convention, the Working Group recommended that 
Brazil expressly prohibit legal entities from engaging in bribery of foreign public 
officials.77 Specifically, in its Phase 2 Review report in 2007, the Working Group 
urged Brazil to “take urgent steps to establish the direct liability of legal persons 
for the bribery of a foreign public official.”78 
Now that Brazil has enacted the Clean Company Act, Nicola Bonucci, the 
director of legal affairs at the OECD, has acknowledged that the Act is “an 
important step toward bringing Latin America’s largest economy into line with 
international standards.”79 
III. DOES THE BRAZILIAN CLEAN COMPANY ACT MEASURE UP TO THE OECD 
CONVENTION? 
The Clean Company Act has been called “[t]he ‘next big thing’ in global 
anti-corruption,” “tough,” “far-reaching,” and “landmark.”80 As companies across 
the world prepare to comply with the Act, the question is how the law compares 
to the Anti-Bribery Convention. This section compares each of the Convention’s 
relevant provisions to those of the Clean Company Act. The section concludes 
that the Act either meets or exceeds all Convention requirements, except those on 
enforcement. 
 
74. THE WORKING GROUP, supra note 26, at 2. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 35. 
77. Id.; THE WORKING GROUP , OECD, BRAZIL: PHASE 2 REPORT, supra note 73, at 65. 
78. THE WORKING GROUP, OECD, BRAZIL: PHASE 2 REPORT, supra note 73, at 65. 
79. Stella Dawson, Brazil’s Corporate Bribery Law is a Step Forward but Faces Tough Scrutiny–OECD 
official, THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION (Nov. 22, 2013, 22:28 GMT), http://www.trust.org/item/ 
20131122222839-uqg1w. 
80. T. Markus Funk et al., The ‘Next Big Thing’ in Global Anti-Corruption: The Brazil Clean Companies 
Act, WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, Apr. 2014, at 12; Brazil Enacts Tough Anti-Bribery Law Required by 
OECD, supra note 27; Brazil Signs into Effect a New, Far-Reaching Anti-Bribery Law: What Impact will it 
have on Your Organization?, NYSE, https://welcome.corpedia.com/events/brazil-signs-into-effect-a-new-far-
reaching-anti-bribery-law-what-impact-will-it-have-on-your-organization/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014); Jaclyn 
Jaeger, Brazil Passes Landmark Anti-Bribery Law, COMPLIANCE WEEK (July 9, 2013), http://www. 
complianceweek.com/brazil-passes-landmark-anti-bribery-law/article/302203/. 
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A. The Offense of Bribery 
There are several elements of what constitutes the offense of bribery under 
the Anti-Bribery Convention.81 The following discussion presses that the Clean 
Company Act either meets or exceeds each element, as defined in the 
Convention. 
1. Definition of Bribery 
Under the Anti-Bribery Convention, the offense of bribery includes 
intentional offers, promises, or actual giving of any “undue pecuniary or other 
advantage,” directly or indirectly, to a foreign public official “for that official or 
for a third party,” so that the official would act in such a manner in relation to her 
official duties that an improper advantage is bestowed.82 The foreign public 
official’s culpable conduct includes affirmative acts as well as omissions.83 
Furthermore, the offense of bribery includes “complicity” in an act of bribery.84 
Consequently, authorizing, inciting, or aiding and abetting acts of international 
bribery are also forbidden.85 
The Clean Company Act adopts an expansive definition of bribery and refers 
to it as “acts against the public administration, national or foreign.”86 Such acts 
include the following: 
I. Promoting, offering, or giving, directly or indirectly, “an improper 
benefit to a public agent” or to a person related to the public agent; 
II. Financing, sponsoring, subsidizing, or bearing the cost, in any 
manner, for the performance of specified illegal acts; 
III. Utilizing third parties to cover up the offense, its perpetrators, or 
beneficiaries; 
IV. Hindering or defrauding the “competitive nature” 87 of public requests 
for bids and contracts in any manner; and 
V. Hindering or interfering with the investigatory or supervisory work 
of public bodies. 88 
 
81. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 





86. Clean Company Act, art. 5 (Braz.). 
87. Art 5. further enumerates specific forbidden acts concerning public requests for bids and contracts. Id. 
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The Clean Company Act not only meets but exceeds the scope set by the 
Convention as to what constitutes the offense of bribery. First, the Convention’s 
definition only applies to bribery of foreign public officials.89 The FCPA follows 
this approach and forbids only bribery of foreign public officials.90 By contrast, 
the Clean Company Act applies to bribery of both foreign and domestic public 
officials.91 Second, the Act goes beyond the essential elements of the offense of 
bribery under the Convention—namely, promising, offering, giving, aiding, 
attempting, and conspiring—and includes in its definition of bribery: financially 
supporting bribery, covering up bribery or its perpetrators, hindering or 
defrauding the “competitive nature” of public requests for bids and contracts, and 
hindering the investigatory or supervisory work of public entities.92 Third, the 
Convention expressly excludes small facilitation payments to public officials 
from the definition of bribery.93 Essentially, small payments made to public 
officials in order to induce them to perform their duties, “such as issuing licenses 
or permits,” are not a part of the offense of bribery under the Convention.94 The 
FCPA also does not expressly apply to such payments.95 The Clean Company 
Act, on the other hand, includes facilitation payments within the scope of its 
definition of bribery, and provides no exceptions for such payments.96 Brazil has 
reasoned that even if such payments may be small in amount, they nevertheless 
injure morality, credibility, and efficiency of public service.97 
2. Persons Covered 
Article 1 of the Convention prohibits “any person” from intentionally 
committing acts of foreign bribery.98 The term, “person” includes legal persons, 
such as corporations and other legal entities, as well as natural persons.99 
 
88. Id. 
89. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
supra note 28, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
90. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2 (West 1988). 
91. Clean Company Act, art. 5 (Braz.). 
92. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
supra note 28, at art. 1, ¶ 1; id. 
93. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
supra note 28, at cmt. 9. 
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95. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd1(b), -2(b) (West 1988). 
96. Clean Company Act, arts. 1, 5 (Braz.). 
97. Brazil made this explanation in the context of not excluding small facilitation payments from the 
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The Clean Company Act complies with this requirement and expressly 
applies to legal persons, including business companies, professional companies, 
foundations, and associations of entities or persons.100 The corporate or 
organizational structure of these legal persons is irrelevant under the Act.101 
Additionally, managers, administrators, or any natural persons of the legal entity, 
who participated in the illegal act may also be held individually liable. 102 
Individuals are liable to the extent of culpability of their acts. 103 
The Act reaches beyond the Convention’s express requirements as to persons 
covered in two ways. First, it applies even if the legal entity undergoes a merger, 
transformation, or contractual change.104 Second, any legal entity related to that 
change guilty of bribing a foreign public official is jointly and severally liable, 
but only to the extent of having to pay any fines and indemnification for damages 
caused by the offense.105 Thus, any controlled or controlling companies of the 
offending legal entity may be jointly and severally liable.106 
3. Nature of the Offense 
At the very outset, in its first Article, the Convention states that parties “shall 
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence” 
to engage in bribery of any foreign public officials.107 Given such clear and 
express preference, one issue of great concern to the OECD is that the Act only 
imposes civil and administrative liabilities on offenders.108 The Act does not 
declare that bribery of foreign public officials by legal entities is a criminal 
offense.109 
Under the Brazilian system, corporations and other enterprises, as legally 
created, artificial entities, are not deemed capable of criminal liability.110 The 
Brazilian Constitution does create two narrow exceptions to this rule. First, under 
Article 225, Paragraph 3, legal entities engaging in conduct “injurious to the 
environment” may face criminal liabilities.111 However, criminal penalties under 
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this exception have rarely been imposed on legal entities, if ever.112 Also, the 
underlying theory behind this exception remains controversial in Brazil.113 
Second, Article 173.V, Paragraph 5, of the Brazilian Constitution of 1998 
provides for criminal penalties if legal entities engage in acts “against the 
economic and financial order and against the popular economy.”114 In its Phase 1 
Review report of 2004, the Working Group contemplated that Brazil could 
impose criminal liability upon legal entities engaging in bribery of foreign 
officials under this exception.115 However, Brazilian authorities rejected the 
possibility and explained that there was no likelihood that Brazil will impose 
criminal liability on legal entities under this exception in the near future because 
such liability remained a “subject of intense academic debate” in Brazil.116 
Although laws have been enacted under this exception, any proposals in draft 
bills to impose criminal liability on legal entities were defeated.117 
The Clean Company Act’s refusal to classify bribery of foreign public 
officials by legal entities as a criminal offense does not render the Act non-
compliant with the Convention. Although the Convention has an express 
preference for criminal liability, it does not require parties to place such 
liability.118 Official Commentary 20119 explains that parties are not required to 
impose criminal liability on legal entities if, under that party’s legal system, 
criminal liability is not applicable to legal entities.120 
Germany is one such party.121 Like Brazil, Germany has rejected the concept 
of imposing criminal liability upon legal entities.122 Thus, although corruption is a 
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criminal offense for individuals, the German Act on Combating International 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions only 
creates administrative liability for legal entities engaging in bribery of foreign 
public officials.123 Nevertheless, the Working Group has concluded that the 
German Act meets the Convention’s requirements.124 
4. Strict Liability 
The Convention only applies to those individuals or legal entities that had the 
requisite intent to commit an act of bribery of a foreign public official.125 
Similarly, the FCPA requires a finding of corrupt intent.126 The Clean Company 
Act, on the other hand, contains no intent requirement and expressly imposes 
strict civil and administrative liabilities on legal entities.127 No showing of 
negligence or willfully corrupt conduct is necessary under the Act.128 Thus, as 
long as the offense was committed in the interest of the legal entity, or for its 
benefit, the legal entity is liable under the Act.129 President Dilma Rousseff was 
quoted as saying, “‘what do we have to lose?’” when explaining her decision to 
exercise her line item veto power to delete any fault or intent requirement from 
the Act.130 She believed that such requirements would result in insufficient 
disincentives for engaging in the offense of bribery of public officials.131 
B. Responsibility of Legal Persons 
Article 2 of the Anti-Bribery Convention directly addresses accountability of 
legal persons.132 The Convention provides: “Each Party shall take such measures 
as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the 
liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.”133 Prior to 
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enacting the Clean Company Act, Brazil did not expressly forbid legal entities 
from engaging in this offense.134 The Act complies with the Convention’s 
requirement and imposes strict civil and administrative liability on legal entities 
engaging in the offense.135 
C. Sanctions 
The Convention requires that parties impose “effective, proportionate or 
dissuasive criminal penalties,” on those involved in bribery of foreign public 
officials.136 Such penalties must be comparable to those imposed upon offenders 
involved in bribery of the party’s own public officials.137 Additionally, bribes, 
proceeds of bribery of a foreign public official, or property that corresponds in 
value to such proceeds should be subject to seizure and confiscation.138 If seizure 
and confiscation are not possible, parties should impose “monitory sanctions of 
comparable effect.”139 In addition to these penalties, the Convention recommends 
that parties shall consider imposing civil or administrative sanctions. The 
Convention allows parties to adopt non-criminal penalties, as long as they are 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive,” if that party’s laws do not allow 
criminal penalties against entities.140 
The Clean Company Act exceeds the Convention’s requirements on 
sanctions, as it imposes several layers of severe fines and other harsh 
consequences on legal entities engaging in bribery of foreign public officials.141 
1. Administrative Fines 
The Clean Company Act imposes fines ranging from 0.1% to 20% of “gross 
billings” of the company during the fiscal year.142 If gross billings of a company 
cannot be determined, fines ranging from R$6,000143 to R$60,000,000 shall be 
imposed.144 In any event, these fines must be equal to or greater than the benefits 
gained from the acts of bribery, as defined under the Act.145 However, the Act 
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enumerates the following eight factors for enforcing authorities to consider when 
deciding severity of penalties: 
 I. Seriousness of the violation; 
 II. Benefit gained or sought by the violator; 
 III. Whether the violation was consummated or not; 
 IV. Degree of injury or danger of injury resulting from the violation; 
 V. Negative effects caused by the violation; 
 VI. Financial status of the violator; 
 VII. Whether the legal person cooperated in discovering the violation; 
 VIII. Whether the legal person had established internal mechanisms and 
procedures for integrity, audit, and incentives to report irregularities 
and whether the legal person effectively applied its codes of ethics 
and conduct within the framework it established; 
 IX. The number of contracts the legal person holds with the injured 
entity.146 
2. Publication of Adverse Judgment 
In addition to potentially severe administrative fines, in case of an adverse 
judgment against a legal entity, the Act provides for “extraordinary publication” 
of such a judgment.147 The Act mandates that a summary of the adverse judgment 
against a legal entity be made publically visible in at least three places: i) in a 
widely-circulated publication of the area where the violation occurred and where 
the legal entity operated,148 ii) in the entity’s establishment or place of business, 
and iii) on the entity’s website.149 The summary should remain posted for at least 
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3. Judicial Liability 
The Clean Company Act imposes judicial liability upon legal entities, in 
addition to administrative liability.151 The Act gives federal and local 
governments the authority to prosecute actions against legal entities suspected of 
engaging in bribery of public officials.152 Specifically, attorney’s offices, legal 
representation agencies, entities equivalent to legal representation agencies, and 
public ministries of the Union, the states, the Federal District, and the 
municipalities may bring cases against legal entities.153 Any of the following 
judicial penalties may be imposed upon a legal entity found guilty of violating 
the Clean Company Act: 
 I. Confiscation of money, assets, or rights that represent a direct or 
indirect benefit resulting from the violation;154 
 II. Suspension or partial prohibition of operations; 
 III. Compulsory dissolution of the legal entity “shall be ordered” if it 
were proved that: i) the entity was “habitually used to facilitate or 
promote” bribery of public officials or ii) the legal entity “was 
established to cover up or hide illegal interests or identity” of the 
beneficiaries of bribery of public officials; 
 IV. A ban on receiving incentives, subsidies, subventions, donations, or 
loans from public entities and public financial institutions.155 This ban 
may last for a period of one year to five years.156 
4. Leniency Agreements 
The Convention does not contain any provisions prescribing its signatories to 
enter into leniency agreements with entities engaging in bribery of foreign public 
officials.157 The Clean Company Act, however, gives “public bodies” the 
discretion to enter into leniency agreements with such entities if all of the 
following conditions are met: 
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I. Legal entity responsible for committing the offense “effectively 
collaborates” with authorities in investigation and administrative 
proceedings; 
II. The legal entity was the party who first expressed the desire to 
cooperate with authorities in investigation of its illegal acts; 
III. Starting on the date when a leniency agreement was proposed, the 
legal entity completely ceased its involvement in the illegal acts; and 
IV. The legal entity admitted that it participated in the illegal acts, “fully 
and permanently” cooperated with authorities in investigation, and 
appeared in all administrative proceedings whenever requested, at its 
own expense.158 
There are two express requirements under the Act for the finding that the 
legal entity “effectively collaborated” with authorities.159 First, if applicable, the 
legal entity must identify any other parties that were involved in the violation.160 
Second, the legal entity must promptly turn over all information and documents 
that prove the illegal act.161 In the event that the legal entity fails to comply with a 
finalized leniency agreement, the entity will be prevented from entering into a 
new agreement for three years, starting with the date of noncompliance.162 
Successfully entering into a leniency agreement with the authorities may 
result in a reduction of penalties for the legal entity.163 For example, the entity’s 
fines may be reduced by up to two-thirds.164 Moreover, the entity may be exempt 
from certain administrative and judicially imposed civil penalties.165 The Act 
specifies that a legal entity that manages to enter into a leniency agreement may 
be able to avoid: i) extraordinary publication of the adverse judgment against it, 
and ii) the harsh judicial penalty of suspension or compulsory dissolution of the 
entity.166 However, entering into a leniency agreement does not relieve the entity 
of its liability to fully cure any damage caused by the violation.167 
That the Clean Company Act allows for such leniency agreements is of great 
concern to the OECD.168 The Working Group is specifically concerned about the 
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degree of leniency that might be given to such companies because similar 
provisions have proven controversial in Russia and some Eastern European 
countries.169 However, the allowance for leniency agreements does not make the 
Brazilian Act per se noncompliant with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
This is evident from the fact that the United States allows for varying degrees of 
leniency in consequences if the legal entity cooperates.170 For example, the DOJ 
takes into account self-reporting, cooperation, and remedial efforts by the entity 
when resolving FCPA violation matters.171 The United States also allows deferred 
prosecution agreements as a result of cooperation by the legal entity.172 
5. The Clean Company Act’s Sanctions are Effective, Proportionate, and 
Dissuasive 
Article 3 of the Convention provides: “In the event that, under the legal 
system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that 
Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions.”173 The sanctions imposed by the Clean 
Company Act meet the Convention’s requirement of being effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive.174 This is illustrated by the fact that the sanctions 
imposed under the Act are either similar to or even more severe and far-reaching 
than those imposed by other nations that have aggressively enforced the Anti-
Bribery Convention through their own laws, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.175 
For instance, administrative penalties under the Clean Company Act176 are 
comparable to the corporate penalties under the FCPA, which can range up to 
two million dollars, or twice the amount of the monetary gain that the legal entity 
sought when engaging in bribery.177 Moreover, unlike the Act, neither the FCPA 
nor the U.K.’s 2010 Bribery Act impose joint and several liability upon parent, 
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subsidiary, or affiliated companies.178 Lastly, while the FCPA and the U.K. 
Bribery Act do not provide for dissolution of legal entities, the Clean Company 
Act does.179 
D. Jurisdiction 
The Convention requires that if the offense of bribery of a foreign public 
official is committed within a party’s territory, the party should take necessary 
measures to establish jurisdiction over that bribery.180 Parties should establish 
jurisdiction even if the violation was only partly committed within its territory.181 
Furthermore, parties that already have jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for 
offenses committed outside the party’s territory should establish jurisdiction to 
prosecute instances of bribery of foreign public officials.182 
The Clean Company Act meets the Convention’s requirements relating to 
jurisdiction. It establishes jurisdiction over legal entities domiciled in Brazil, or 
those with representation offices located in Brazil.183 The Act also establishes 
jurisdiction over legal entities that are affiliated with such companies.184 For 
example, the Act applies to controlling companies, controlled companies, related 
companies, companies within the framework of a contract, and consortium 
partners.185 The Act applies even if the legal entity is temporarily established in 
Brazil.186 Lastly, the Brazilian Act meets the Convention’s requirement on 
extending jurisdictions to violations committed outside a party’s territory by 
providing that it applies to violations committed by Brazilian legal entities 
against foreign public administrations outside Brazil.187 
E. Statute of Limitations 
Article 6 of the Convention states that any “statute of limitations applicable 
to the offence of bribery of a foreign public official shall allow an adequate 
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Company Act adopts a statute of limitations of five years, calculated from the 
date when the violation became known to the authorities.189 In cases of ongoing 
violations, the time is calculated from the date when the violation ended.190 
Moreover, the statute of limitations is tolled upon institution of administrative or 
judicial proceedings commenced for the purpose of determining whether a legal 
entity violated the Act.191 
The Clean Company Act meets the Convention’s requirement of adopting a 
statute of limitation that allows adequate time for investigation and prosecution 
of violations. First, the Working Group has approved the statute of limitations 
period adopted by the FCPA, which is five years from the time that the violation 
was committed.192 The Act adopts a longer period because it provides for a statute 
of limitation which starts from the time when the violation became known.193 
F. Extradition 
The Convention requires that bribery of foreign officials should be 
considered an extraditable offense under the laws of the parties to the 
Convention.194 Additionally, parties “shall take any measures necessary to assure 
either that it can extradite its nationals or that it can prosecute its nationals for the 
offence of bribery of a foreign public official.”195 
The Clean Company Act does not expressly declare bribery of foreign public 
officials as an extraditable offense.196 However, Brazil has stated that “bribery of 
a foreign public official is an offence for which extradition can be granted within 
the scope of its [existing, specific extradition] laws and extradition treaties with 
other Parties to the Convention.”197 Additionally, the Act established jurisdiction 
over violations committed by Brazilian legal entities against foreign public 
administrations outside Brazil.198 Therefore, the Brazilian law meets the 
Convention’s requirements on extradition. 
 
189. Clean Company Act, art. 25 (Braz.). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. In its Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3 review reports, the Working Group has encouraged the United 
States to adopt a longer statute of limitations. THE WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, OECD, UNITED STATES: 
FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 175, at 5. 
193. Clean Company Act, art. 25 (Braz.). 
194. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 28, at art. 10. 
195. Id. 
196. See generally Clean Company Act (Braz.). 
197. THE WORKING GROUP, supra note 26, at 35; THE WORKING GROUP, OECD, BRAZIL: PHASE 2 
REPORT, supra note 73, at 31. 
198. Clean Company Act, art. 28 (Braz.). 
2015 / Brazil’s Landmark Clean Company Act 
478 
G. Monitoring and Follow-Up 
When signing on to the Convention, parties agree to cooperate with the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery in “carrying out a [program] of systematic 
follow-up” and monitoring to assure full implementation of the Convention.199 
Brazil has cooperated with the Working Group in completing three, rigorous 
reviews.200 The Phase 1 review was completed in September 2004.201 Phase 2 
Review took place in December 2007.202 Recently, during May 2014 through 
October 2014, the Working Group completed its Phase 3 review of Brazil’s 
efforts to implement the Convention.203 For this purpose, members of the Group 
conducted an on-site visit, where they met representatives of the Brazilian public 
and private sectors, media, a Parliamentarian, the Minister of State, and Head of 
the Office of the Comptroller-General.204 The evaluation team expressed “its 
appreciation to Brazil for its efforts in the evaluation process.”205 Brazil, thus, 
meets the requirements of this provision. 
H. Enforcement 
The Convention allows parties to investigate and prosecute instances of 
bribery of foreign public officials based on their own “rules and principles.”206 
The Convention, however, requires that parties do not consider national 
economic interest, potential effect on relations with other states, or the identity of 
the offender when investigating or prosecuting bribery.207 In its 2007 Revised 
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
the OECD put forth two additional measures.208 First, “complaints of bribery of 
foreign public officials should be seriously investigated by competent 
authorities.”209 Second, governments of parties to the Convention should provide 
adequate resources to allow effective prosecution of such bribery.210 
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Brazil is yet to meet the Convention’s requirements on enforcement. In 2014, 
Transparency International categorized Brazil as a country that was engaged in 
“Little or No Enforcement” of the Anti-Bribery Convention.211 To make matters 
worse, just recently, Brazil’s state-run oil giant, Petrobras, became engulfed in 
allegations of corruption and money-laundering, allegedly involving hundreds of 
millions of dollars.212 Given such state of affairs, as Nicola Bonucci has 
recognized, the critical question is how Brazil will to enforce its Clean Company 
Act.213 
Notwithstanding the recent corruption scandals in Brazil, it should not be 
ignored that Brazil has recently taken several revolutionary and promising steps 
towards fighting corruption.214 It is significant that the country passed the 
landmark Clean Company Act.215 Prior to enacting the law, President Rousseff 
exercised her line item veto power to reject three provisions of the bill because 
those provisions would have reduced the bill’s impact.216 Moreover, in June 2013, 
Brazil’s Senate passed a bill that declared corruption a “‘heinous crime,’” 
increasing the minimum prison sentence from two to four years for individuals 
guilty of this crime.217 In 2012, the Brazilian Supreme Court transfixed the 
country when it publicly tried and convicted several officials accused of 
engaging in a vote-buying scheme for the former President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva.218 Twelve of these officials were sent to prison even though their cases 
were still on appeal.219 Carlos Ayres, co-chair of the anti-corruption and 
compliance committee of the Brazilian Institute of Business Law, has reported 
that “number of arrests for public corruption has increased 133 percent since 
2008.”220 It is still uncertain, however, that Brazil will effectively enforce the 
Clean Company Act.221 
 
211. The report also shows that 30 out of the 40 countries who have signed the OECD Convention are 
barely investigating and prosecuting bribery of foreign public officials. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 2, at 
2, 5-7. 
212. Mary Anastasia O’Grady, An Escalating Corruption Scandal Rocks Brazil, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 
2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/an-escalating-corruption-scandal-rocks-brazil-1428876380. 
213. Dawson, supra note 79. 
214. Spalding, supra note 130. 
215. Id. 
216. President Rousseff rejected the following provisions: i) limit on “financial liability to the value of 
the contract obtained with the bribe,” ii) showing of intent or fault requirement for some sanctions, and iii) 
lenient treatment of defendant if government itself was also involved in corruption. Id. 
217. Brazil Senate Toughens Punishments for Corruption, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23081103. 
218. Dawson, supra note 79. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. LaCroix, supra note 18; Stuart Vincent Campbell, Perception is Not Reality: The FCPA, Brazil, and 
the Mismeasurement of Corruption, 22 MINN. J. INTL. L. 247 (2013). 
2015 / Brazil’s Landmark Clean Company Act 
480 
IV. THREE KEY STEPS TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN 
COMPANY ACT 
Brazil should take at least three key steps in order to effectively enforce the 
Clean Company Act. Brazil should make it a top priority to aggressively and 
objectively investigate and prosecute cases of bribery of public officials.222 All 
enforcement agencies across Brazil should adopt uniform procedures and 
interpretations under the Clean Company Act.223 Brazil should collaborate with 
other countries, such as the United States, in investigation and prosecution.224 
A. Aggressive and Objective Prosecution 
In order to effectively enforce its ambitious Clean Company Act, Brazil 
should adopt the attitude of countries that have been declared the champions in 
enforcing the Anti-Bribery Convention through their own laws.225 Such countries 
include United States, Germany, and United Kingdom.226 The common thread 
among these countries’ efforts is that they have made it a top priority to 
aggressively and objectively investigate and prosecute instances of bribery of 
foreign public officials.227 
In addition to having the right attitude, aggressive enforcement involves 
strengthening agencies in charge of investigation and prosecution.228 Because the 
Clean Company Act allows multiple governmental agencies to bring actions 
against legal entities suspected of engaging in bribery, Brazil should properly 
invest in strengthening all such agencies.229 Brazil should also take measures to 
properly train its investigators and prosecutors, belonging to all enforcement 
agencies.230 
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Aggressive and objective prosecution is especially important for Brazil 
because corruption has become deeply-rooted in the country.231 Despite well-
known and substantial problems with corruption, Brazil did not commence any 
prosecutions involving foreign bribery between 2009 to 2012.232 Furthermore, 
only four investigations were commenced during the same period.233 The country 
has performed “Little or No Enforcement” of the Anti-Bribery Convention.234 In 
such circumstances, it is imperative that Brazil aggressively and objectively 
investigate and prosecute any cases involving bribery. 
B. Uniform Procedures and Interpretation of the Clean Company Act 
The Brazilian Act allows several different governmental agencies to enforce 
its provisions.235 Specifically, administrative authorities, public prosecutors, and 
government regulators may bring actions against legal entities suspected of 
engaging in bribery.236 While such allocation of authority gives power to several 
layers of governmental entities, it also creates the possibility that different 
entities will adopt different procedures.237 Even worse, it is possible that different 
enforcement agencies will interpret key terms of the Act differently.238 For 
example, different local authorities across Brazil could adopt contradictory 
criteria for what constitutes an “adequate compliance scheme,” as outlined under 
Article 6 § 6 of the Act.239 Similarly, different enforcement agencies could 
determine differently as to what constitutes “hindering the investigatory or 
supervisory work of public bodies,” an ambiguous provision of the Act.240 Some 
commentators are concerned that if different enforcement authorities across 
Brazil chose to adopt different procedures and interpretations than those adopted 
by the federal government, ambiguity and even more corruption could result.241 
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In order to ensure that the Clean Company Act is enforced effectively and 
evenly, Brazil should take steps to adopt uniform procedures and interpretations 
under the Act.242 It may be best for all enforcement authorities to adopt the 
procedures and interpretations adopted by the federal government.243 This seems 
particularly suitable because recently the federal government has taken 
affirmative, concrete steps in the right direction, showing at least an outwardly 
determination to seriously crack down on corruption in Brazil.244 If federal 
procedures and interpretations reflect a similar zeal for uprooting corruption, 
universal application of those exact procedures and interpretations may be the 
best solution for Brazil. 
C. Collaboration with Other Nations in Investigation and Prosecution 
Corruption can be hard to detect, especially corruption on international 
level.245 As Hamilton Cruz, one of the directors at Brazil’s Office of the 
Comptroller General, explained, “‘It is not easy to follow the money. It is not 
easy to locate a fake company. It is not easy to see who took the decision (to 
bribe).’”246 Moreover, some of the most notable successes in investigation and 
prosecution of bribery at the international level were the result of joint efforts 
between two or more countries.247 For instance, a 2008 joint investigation by 
Germany and the United States of Siemens AG, a German engineering 
multinational company, resulted in $1.3 billion in fines for the company.248 
Investigation and prosecution of TSKJ, a consortium of four multinational 
companies, involved enforcement authorities of five countries, namely France, 
Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.249 Furthermore, the 
United States and United Kingdom jointly investigated and prosecuted BAE 
Systems PLC, a global defense and aerospace company.250 
It is clear that Brazil can benefit from collaborating with other countries in 
investigation and prosecution of suspected bribery, whether it has treaties with 
those countries or not. Fortunately for Brazil, since the enactment of the Clean 
Company Act, the DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the SEC have 
been “much more willing to share information with Brazil on fraud, bribery and 
 
242. See id. 
243. Id.; Macknay, supra note 237. 
244. See supra Part III.H. 
245. Stella Dawson, Interview- Brazil will Soften Bribery Sanctions on Companies with Strong 
compliance, THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION (Dec. 11, 2013, 08:03 AM), http://www.trust.org/item/ 
20131211080313-hl76f/?source=search. 
246. Id. 
247. Spahn, supra note 224, at 23-31. 
248. See Tyler, supra note 224, at 137. 
249. Spahn, supra note 224, at 28-29. 
250. Id.; About BAE Systems in the United States, BAE SYSTEMS, http://www.baesystems.com/our-
company-rus/bae-systems-inc-rus/about-us?_afrLoop=275438789221000 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
483 
corruption.”251 Brazil and United States are already working together in 
investigating allegations of bribery against a leading Brazilian aircraft 
manufacturing company, Embraer.252 Brazil should continue to collaborate with 
United States and other countries from across the globe in order to effectively 
enforce the Clean Company Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Some commentators believe that the situation of corruption among Brazilian 
public officials is analogous to the following: “‘Just as a fish moving under water 
cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so 
government servants employed in the government work cannot be found out 
while taking money for themselves.’”253 However, Brazil is now at an important 
crossroads. On one hand, it has been rapidly growing locally and 
internationally.254 It increasingly serves as “the global or regional headquarters for 
multinational corporations.”255 It continues its efforts to attract foreign 
investment.256 On the other hand, companies across the globe are progressively 
unwilling to do business in countries where bribery and corruption are rampant.257 
Although Brazil has a deeply-rooted problem of corruption, Brazilians have 
vehemently spoken up against corruption in their country.258 The Brazilian 
government has finally taken a tough stance against corruption in enacting the 
Clean Companies Act, a law that either meets or exceeds the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention’s requirements.259 All eyes are on Brazil as it prepares to host the 
Olympic Games in 2016.260 Against this backdrop, it is imperative that Brazil take 
all necessary measures to actively and aggressively enforce its new anti-bribery 
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